THE COMING OF THE BRITISH CONSERVATIVE PARTY TO OFFICE IN 1951 AND THE NATIONALISATION OF THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL COMPANY’S CRISIS.
The International Bank also made an attempt to mediate in the dispute between Britain and Iran. This mediation failed too, since the Iranian Prime Minister, Musaddiq, wanted the Bank to act on behalf of the Iranian Government, within the nationalisation law, and the operating staff to come from neutral countries, something which was not acceptable to the British Government.
The Truman Administration believed that an economic collapse in Iran would lead to a Communist takeover. Therefore, to maintain stability, as was discussed, in an important part of the world, the Unite States provided economic aid to Iran. Furthermore, on 30th August 1952, Churchill and Truman sent a proposal to Musaddiq, that the question of compensation for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s loss of oil due to breaking of the 1933 Agreement should be submitted to arbitration. The discussion in this chapter indicated that Musaddiq was not prepared to give further consideration to the Anglo-American proposal.
Upon his coming to office in January 1953, the Republican President Eisenhower, to get a quick diplomatic victory soon after coming to office, put a new set of proposals on 20th February to the Iranian Government. The Iranian Government again rejected the proposals as was explained in this chapter.
By now Musaddiq was seen as too destabilising by the new American President, Eisenhower. Furthermore, now, on both sides of the Atlantic, Conservative governments were in power. Both were concerned about the threat of a Communist takeover in Iran. Both governments had vested economic and political interests in that part of the world. Accessibility of Iranian oil reserves to the West was of paramount importance to both Churchill and Eisenhower. Therefore, American policy moved towards the British position.
Not only was the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company considered a major threat to the British economy, but also an embarrassment for the British Government in regard to its relations with Arab states, and British economic interests in the Middle East in general.
