THE COMING OF THE BRITISH CONSERVATIVE PARTY TO OFFICE IN 1951 AND THE NATIONALISATION OF THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL COMPANY’S CRISIS.

THE COMING OF THE BRITISH CONSERVATIVE PARTY TO OFFICE IN 1951 AND THE NATIONALISATION OF THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL COMPANY’S CRISIS.

Anthony Eden, the Conservative Foreign Secretary, was an old Iran hand. At the University of Oxford Anthony Eden studied Persian, ‘which he continued to refer to as “the Italian of the East”.’27 Eden had served as Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office at the time of the Iranian oil crisis of 1933, which was discussed in the earlier part of the thesis. He had been to Iran and had seen the oil fields. ‘In 1951 he had denounced the Iranians for stealing British property.’28 When Eden became Foreign Secretary after the fall of the Labour Government, one of his major anxieties became the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s crisis. He wrote at the end of the critical year of 1954:

It is a strange thing about this year that though many people have written about the problems which we have, we hope, solved, Western European Union, Egypt, Indo-China, Iran, Arabia (Buraimi), very few have given much credit to Iran, which was, I believe, the toughest of all.29

Eden did not believe that there was any communist threat to Iran.
I did not accept the argument that the only alternative to Musaddiq was Communist rule. I thought that if Musaddiq fell, his place might well be taken by a more reasonable government with which it would be possible to conclude a satisfactory agreement.30

Later, after the breakdown of talks in Washington, Eden declared in the House of Commons on 20th November,

that there were three essential elements of a satisfactory solution. ‘First… the Persian economy cannot be assured unless the oil industry can be efficiently operated in all its stages. Second, the benefits should be fairly shared between Persia and those concerned with the development of her oil resources… Finally, fair compensation must be paid for the fact of nationalisation and its consequences. It cannot be settled by one party alone.’31

When the discussions between the US officials and Dr. Musaddiq collapsed, while still in the United States, Dr. Musaddiq appealed to President Truman for a loan of $120,000,000. The President replied that ‘this application would be given careful consideration.’32 Churchill complained that the American administration was still contemplating giving financial aid to Iran. It became a dilemma. To grant the loan would wreck Britain’s carefully calculated scheme to allow Iran to fall, but to allow Iran to fall was altogether too risky from the United States administration’s point of view.

So diplomacy began to take a different turn. ‘To keep the Americans happy, Eden and Churchill allowed further talks to be held.’33 As was seen earlier in this dissertation, two missions failed to solve the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s crisis. One was the mission of Averell Harriman, the personal advisor to President Truman, and the other was the British mission of Lord Privy Seal, Richard Stokes. Now, while Dr. Musaddiq was in the United States to defend Iran’s position before the Security Council, a further mission was launched. This time ‘the International Bank offered to act as a friendly intermediary.’34

The Vice-President of the International Bank, at the suggestion of the Pakistani Ambassador to Washington, informed Dr. Musaddiq that the International Bank would be willing to try to make temporary arrangements for the operation of the Iranian industry, pending a final settlement, if invited to do so by both Britain and Iran.

Although Dr. Musaddiq remained non-commital, he expressed a desire to study the suggestion and requested that it should be put to the British Government. The Vice-President of the International Bank submitted a memorandum to the British Government explaining his ideas. The British Government in return underlined that any arrangements contemplated by the International Bank must be without prejudice to the legal rights of both the Iranian Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in any final settlement. Moreover, any subsequent discussions on it were designed to assist the Bank in working out a plan: the International Bank itself would have to decide whether it constituted a suitable basis for negotiations with the Iranian Government.

  1. J. A. BILL and W.R. LOUIS, op. cit., p. 244.
  2. Ibid, p. 245,
  3. A. EDEN, Full Circle, (London: Cassell & Co. Ltd., 1960), p. 248.
  4. B. LAPPING, op. cit., pp. 264-265.
  5. L. P. ELWELL-SUTTON, op. cit., p. 264.
  6. D. N. WILBER, Iran: Past and Present, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 115.
  7. B. LAPPING, op. cit., pp. 265.
  8. D. N. WILBER, op. cit., p. 115.

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