British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.
The
American proposal was subsequently discussed between Dean
Acheson and Anthony Eden in Paris. The British Government was
insistent that the issue of compensation should be submitted to
international arbitration.59
Again, on
20th February 1953, a new set of proposals were put
forward to the Iranian Government, authorised by the Republican
administration of Eisenhower, to get a diplomatic victory soon after
assuming office. The American Government was to give Iran a sum of
$100,000,000 against oil purchases. The compensation issue was to be
submitted to the International Court of Justice. Iran was to set
aside 25% of its oil revenue for this matter. Britain, USA and a
number of unspecified countries were to market Iranian oil. On 20th
March 1953, Musaddiq rejected these proposals. The reason for
rejecting them was that Iran could not accept a scheme that would
bind her to compensate the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company through the
remaining term of the old concession, that is until 1993, for its
losses. The other problem with the proposals, the Iranians thought,
was, just as in the past, the sale of the bulk of Iran’s oil at a
large discount (not less than 35%) to an international oil combine
in which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company would be the major
shareholder. The Iranian Government viewed this proposal similar to
the one put forward by Churchill and Truman on 30th August 1952, as
was discussed earlier in this chapter. Additionally, the Iranians
were not prepared to submit the question of compensation to the
International Court, unless, first, the United Kingdom’s government
defined the limits of its claim.60
On 13th
May 1953, Britain rejected Iran’s request. On 20th June
1953, the American President Eisenhower formally took Britain’s
side. On both sides of the Atlantic now conservatives were in power.
The new Republican administration was considerably more worried
about the communist threat. Both the British and American
Governments had little sympathy for nationalism in
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., Chapters 6, 7, 9, 10.
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