British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

CHAPTER FIVE

1954: THE CONSERVATIVE
GOVERNMENT AND THE ENDING OF THE CRISIS

The previous chapter was
concerned with the Conservative Government’s policy
in its coming to office in 1951, towards the nationalisation of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company by the Iranian Government. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
was the most important British enterprise abroad, and the major British
interest in the Persian Gulf. In this chapter attempts will be made to
explain how the Conservative Government managed to bring the nationalisation
crisis to an end.

The Handling of the Crisis

Worried about the spread of the
Soviet influence the area, or a Communist
coup in Iran, the United States pressed Britain to make concessions to
settle in States the oil dispute with Iran. ‘The most desirable solution
would be for AIOC and the Government of Iran to negotiate a settlement
between themselves’, was the American view.1 In reply the British Government emphasised that
concessions would encourage seizure of Western investment elsewhere in
the world. The replacement of Truman, in January 1953, by ‘the new
administration led by Eisenhower and Dulles proved more amenable to
British arguments,’ 2 in the Iranian crisis. As
was said in the previous chapter, on 20th June 1953, President
Eisenhower formally took Britain’s side by writing to the Iranian Prime

  1. Department of State:
    Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the, (Washington
    DC Annual), 1952-54, Vol. IX, p.762, the Near and Middle East,
    Agreed Minutes of the Fourth Session of the United States- French
    talks on Middle East oil, Secret, December 21st 1953.

  2. A.P. DOBSON,
    The Politics of the Anglo-America Economic Special,
    (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988), p.143.

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