British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

through
consequent failure of the purchasing company to fulfil its
contracts with its customers.3

The
British Embassy was also informed on 12th December 1951 Dr.
Musaddiq, the Iranian Prime Minister, that if by 22nd December 1951
no offers came from former purchasers of Iranian oil, the Iranian
Government would feel free to sell to any customer offering to buy
oil. On 22nd December 1951, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company published
a notice in the world press,

that no
oil company of repute or any tanker or any brokers of
standing will countenance any direct indirect participation in the
unlawful actions of the Iranian Government.4

The
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s notice continued to point Out that
it would take ‘all such action as may be necessary to protect its
rights in any country against any concern or individuals who entered
into transactions with the Persian Government.’
5 Consequently, there was not much that private
companies could do to take advantage of the ‘free’ flow of oil
from Iran. Despite all these, the National Iranian Oil Company,
on 18th February 1952, met Count Ettore della Zonca, President
of the Ente Petrolifero Italia-Medio-Oriente, a newly formed
company, and signed a contract for the supply of 400,000 tons of
oil in 1952 and 2,000,000 tons per annum from then onwards for
ten years.

In the
following six months, della Zonca and Hans Prager, his
co-director, made several visits to Iran. In June 1952, the news of
a 632 ton tanker, Rose, taking cargo of 1,000 tons of oil
from Iran on behalf of the Italian firm for a Swiss company,
Bubenberg, leaked out.