British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

and
second only to the 300,000,000 tons of the United States.8

The
Deputy Petroleum Administrator and President of the Standard Oil
Company of Indiana, Bruce Brown, reported that of the daily loss of
660,000 barrels, 500,000 had already been made up from American and
British sources. According to him,

200,000
barrels a day, normally shipped from the Middle East to the
United States, had been diverted to Europe, and production in Texas
and Louisiana stepped up accordingly.9

Though
there was disruption in its trading patterns and efforts had
to be made to rectify matters, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, for
its part, was not financially hit, from the denial to it of its
largest oil fields and its principal refinery, since it had plenty
of other available sources of crude. ‘Kuwait production was
dramatically stepped up to take its place.’
10

Additional liftings were made from Iraq, and production in Qatar was
stepped up rapidly; Kuwaiti oil proved to be particularly plentiful
and even cheaper to produce than Iranian oil, being so located and
under such natural pressure as to flow through quite short pipelines
to tankers without the need for pumping.

The
establishment of the two British and American committees, or the
Joint Plan of Action, besides what has been said, secured schemes
for the purchasing, loan, sale or exchange of crude oil, petroleum
products and blending agents for distribution in foreign countries,
among the participating companies. It provided arrangements for the
most efficient use, without regard to ownership of terminal