British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.
and
storage facilities, tankers, pipelines, and other transportation
facilities to minimise duplications, multiple loadings, and
dischargings, split cargoes, cross hauling and back hauling, and
idle time in port.
As
Iranian oil production was being disrupted, therefore shortage of
fuel had to be made up. Also the Korean War was still going on and
shortage of fuel would have important strategic implications.
Additionally, Britain’s role in the defence of the West was
important and alternative supplies of oil from here had to be found,
even though the US disagreed with British policy in the Iranian
crisis.
Iran was
facing a serious foreign exchange crisis and had been
losing approximately £260 million each year. By this time the
Iranian Prime Minister, Dr. Musaddiq, was anxious to obtain an
emphatic popular endorsement for his policy and the Majlis (the
Iranian Parliament) which was as far committed as he was himself to
such a policy. The new Majlis which assembled in April 1952 voted by
a large majority for the reappointment of Dr. Musaddiq as Prime
Minister. In accordance with the constitution, Musaddiq had resigned
on the election of a new Majlis. To solve the country’s economic
crisis, on 13th July 1952, Musaddiq asked the Majlis to grant him
full powers for a period of six months. This request involved his
taking over the Ministry of War portfolio. The Shah refused his
demand. Musaddiq promptly resigned. Therefore the Shah appointed
Qavam as-Saltane, as the new Prime Minister.
Immediately the supporters of Musaddiq, in alliance with the
clerics, organised violence against the government of Qavam, as a
result of which in Teheran alone 20 people were killed and about 100
wounded in the course of the following days. By coincidence the
International Court of Justice announced at this time that it had no
jurisdiction in the oil dispute; this was regarded as a triumph for
Musaddiq. In view of this predicament, the Shah became convinced
that Musaddiq had the popular support, and that the only way to
suppress such a support would be use of force to a degree that he
was not prepared to countenance.
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