British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

Fear of
communist influence in Iran and ‘the Soviet challenge by
which both felt themselves threatened, drew Britain and the US
closer and closer together’.18 Back in 1952,
during an Anglo-American meeting in Washington on 1st February to
discuss the oil dispute between Britain and Iran, the crisis in Iran
was discussed. It was then agreed that

it was
virtually certain that the left-wing Tudeh party would profit
from the consequent confusion out of which would evolve a government
either infiltrated with Communists or dominated by Communists. It
was feared that Musaddiq was soft on communism, that it was highly
unlikely that he [Musaddiq] would do anything to check Communism in
Persia. This could only be checked by a strong pro-Western
government.19

We no longer hope to come
to an agreement with Musaddiq, whose
replacement has therefore become desirable.20

became the
view of the Foreign Office. Berthoud, Assistant
Under-Secretary of the British Embassy in Teheran, had written back
in 1951, in his report to the Foreign Office, ‘There is already
enough opposition in the Majlis to unseat Mr Moussadek.’
21