British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

operation
with the CIA. Woodhouse, together with several Foreign
Office officials, immediately went to Washington. He sensed that the
Americans, for their part, did not reject the idea of a joint
operation against Musaddiq. The CIA indicated that it was prepared
to discuss the case further. C.M. Woodhouse continued with his
planning until the American Presidential election was over. The
British policy was now, according to Sir Pierson Dixon, ‘to play the
hand along until we can sound out the attitude of General
Eisenhower’s Administration to the Persian oil problem.’
31 By the time Dwight D. Eisenhower won the
Presidential election in November 1952, Woodhouse had completed
the process of undercover planning. Eisenhower’s winning the
election opened for the CIA the prospect of leadership more
active than Truman’s.

As was
explained earlier in this chapter, Musaddiq by 1953 was
losing support among his allies, and receiving the backing of the
Tudeh party (the Communist party in Iran). The uncompromising
position that Musaddiq took, which the previous chapter showed, fear
of communist influence in Iran, the support that in 1953 Musaddiq
was getting from the Tudeh party, and the Soviet challenge, made
America alter its policy from diplomacy to intervention. The United
States Government saw Musaddiq by now as too destabilising to let
him stay in power and that his overthrow would be the solution to
the crisis. The new Republican administration of Dwight Eisenhower
was concerned about the communist takeover in Iran, and access to
the rich Iranian oil reserves by the West was its worry. Eisenhower
came round to the view that the answer to the crisis was
intervention and toppling of Musaddiq’s government. This decision
was also encouraged by the winding down of the Korean War, and more
western manpower was available. On both sides of the Atlantic
conservatives were in power. Additionally, both the British and
American administrators, which was pointed out in Chapter Four of
this thesis, thought nationalism was too dangerous