British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.
On 6th
August 1954, the Guardian wrote that the new agreement
‘should suit the interests both of Persia and of oil
producers’.56 In regard to the question of
Iran paying compensation to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, ‘a net
interest- free payment of £25 million in ten equal annual
instalments beginning on 1st January 1957,’
57 would be made to the AIOC by Iran. The
agreement was signed in 19th September 1954 by the Iranian
Minister of Finance and chief negotiator for Iran, Dr. Ali
Amini, and on 21st September it was put before the Majlis: On
25th September a joint Mailis-Senate oil commission was set up
to study the agreement. On 10th October the debate in the Majlis
began. On 21st October, by 113 votes to 5 with 10 abstaining,
the Majlis ratified the oil agreement. The bill passed the
Senate on 28th October. After the signing by the Shah on 29th
October 1954, the bill became law.58
Back in
July 1954, during the talks, the UK government had
authorised an offer of £5 million to Iran, ‘to further the
conclusion of a satisfactory oil agreement and to promote political
stability in Persia.’
59 After signing of the agreement in October
1954, Anthony Eden recommended a loan of £10 million to Iran,
and said, ‘now that an oil agreement had been concluded large
sterling earnings would accrue to Persia in a few year’s time
and it was in our commercial interest to secure a foothold in
the Persian market.’ 60 Eden also went
on to say ‘a tied loan of this kind would assist the recovery of
our former share of the Persian market.’
61
56. The Guardian, 6th August 1954, in ENAYAT, op. cit., p. 181.
57. PRO, London, FO371/110075,
The General Correspondence of the, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
support to the stockholders, by Sir William Fraser, Chairman of the
Company, Secret, October 1954.
58. F. FESHARAKI, Development of the Iranian
Oil Industry:,
(London: Praeger Publishers, 1976), Chapter 3.
59. PRO, London, CAB 128/27 pt 2 CC (54) 56th
Conclusions, Minute 7,
p. 6.
60. Ibid.
61. PRO, London, CAB 128/27 pt 2 CC (54) 55th
Conclusions, Minute 6,
p.8.
Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177