British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

British
interests in the Persian Gulf as well as 40% share in the
international oil consortium in Iran, as Chapter Five showed being,

1. : 50% of British
   consumption of oil came from Kuwait;

2. : to provide a barrier to the spread of
   Communism.2

   As the United States
   was the only country which could
   withstand the Soviet Union and communist pressure, it was
   clear to the British Government that the United States
   should take the lead.

   Washington’s assessments of the threat posed by the Soviet
   Union to the Persian Gulf, however, did not very much differ
   from those of London. In fact, the United States was
   increasingly showing more signs of understanding over the
   Soviet threat, and the spread of communism to the Persian
   Gulf. In the United States’ view, ‘the proximity of
   important Soviet industries makes the importance of holding
   the Eastern Mediterranean-Middle Eastern area obvious.’
   3

   Increasingly, the Persian Gulf began to play an important
   part in the United States’ strategic thinking for the
   protection of oil supplies, and also lines of communication
   for defence. Containment of the Soviet Union and preventing
   her from reaching to the oil-rich Persian Gulf,
   accessibility to the oil without disruption for producing it
   became the same goal for both the United States, and Great
   Britain.

   The
   Americans were of the opinion that cultivating closer
   economic and political ties with Iran, the most powerful
   state in the Persian Gulf, with its population and
   industrialisation programme would serve Western interests
   better. The United States believed that direct rule would be
   potentially detrimental to the