British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

Forces,
using films, local military radio and printed matters.10

In the
post Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s crisis, by 1956 Iran became
stable and possessed considerable military power.

Safeguarding British interests

On 24th February 1955,
Turkey and Iraq signed in Baghdad a mutual
defence pact. Turkey had been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation since 1952 and was therefore allied with the West.

To
reinforce the defence of the Persian Gulf, and block Soviet
expansion towards it, the United Kingdom on 4th April 1953 adhered
to the pact. Later in 1955 the adherence of Pakistan and Iran took
place.

The
Baghdad Pact, as it became known, with the participation of
Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey, formed a defence line
against Soviet influence towards the Persian Gulf.

The
United States was supportive of the Baghdad Pact as a means of
defence against Soviet influence in the States. The American
‘market’ took the lead. The Iranian crisis was a kind of forerunner
to Suez, because, firstly, it showed that military action was
exceedingly risky. Secondly, that the American dimension was
important, and thirdly, that Britain was in the cruel dilemma of
having to protect her vital interests with one hand tied behind her
back.

Iran
showed that, when all was said and done, diplomacy rather than
force was the only option. But diplomacy is a means of trying to
control an environment which is probably largely beyond one’s
control. Britain’s best option – to engineer a change of government,
could only be achieved through American mediation