British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

There
have been many signs lately that the United States’ navy is
arriving at building up for itself a predominant position in the
Gulf.14

reported
the British Ambassador in Teheran, Sir Roger Stevens, to
Selwyn-Lloyd. The British Ambassador to Teheran however, in his
report on the United Kingdom, for economic and defensive reasons
pursuing a policy of co-operation with the United States, and
Britain’s military position in the Persian Gulf, said:

It is
surely better to devise a constructive way out of this
dead-end, even at the loss of a little prestige, rather than wait to
be overwhelmed by events and thrust on to the inevitably disastrous
defensive.15

Sir Roger Stevens went on,
in his report to the British Foreign
Secretary:

With the liquidation of our
Indian Empire, the traditional reason
for our presence in the Persian Gulf ceased to exist, and our
positions there become stations on a road leading nowhere.16

There
were still, in the eyes of Britain, fairly substantial
interests east of Suez. So the winding up of the Empire in India did
not imply that Britain was finished with this area. Britain’s
interests still included her base in Egypt, her view (as opposed to
the USA’s) of the Baghdad Pact, and her relations with the Persian
Gulf States. Despite the ‘loss’ of India, Britain’s role east of
Suez, especially Malaya/Singapore/Hong Kong, was still very
important and the short route to these countries (and to
Australia/NZ) was still very important.