British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

It was a
little too premature to dismiss the British position in the
Middle East as no longer viable or necessary. In the first place
Britain certainly did not see herself as a power in decline. The
diaries of Patrick Gordon-Walker bring out the continuing concern
with the Empire as a kind of political force in the world and a
force in international relations even though Gordon-Walker was of
course a Labour man.17 Britain had a bit of
luck in the Middle East because of the Russian disappearance from
the scene between 1918 and 1945. But sooner or later this would come
to an end and Britain would have to work a little harder to maintain
her influence. Secondly, Iran was not even a British colony though
she was under British influence, and she was not typical of
Britain’s presence in the Middle East, and that Britain could, to
some extent, see this as an exceptional episode.

Britain’s
post-war presence was damaged by her fragile economic
recovery and the Middle East difficulties. The Empire was largely
intact and there was no power such as France, Germany or Russia to
challenge it. This stability might seem very precarious but it was
good enough to encourage Britain to believe that if she just hung
on, as it were, then the world would come to rights and her Empire
would be secure. Malaya was still a vital British asset and Britain
fought a long guerrilla war there.

The
British Government felt that the hydrogen bomb which the Soviet
Union possessed changed everything even further. In 1957 Britain
successfully tested her hydrogen bomb (having exploded an atomic
bomb in 1952). According to a Cabinet memo: