British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.
the United
States, and that Britain should not be restricted to act by the
United States’ reluctance, and should act without their concurrence if
necessary.
Following the
nationalisation of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian Government
in 1956, without consulting the United States, independently Britain
proceeded. The United Kingdom, in an Anglo-Franco-Israeli plan launched an
attack on Egypt. Thus the conspiracy with Israel and France was the cloak
for military action which in the case of Iran was not present.
The Suez
military operation by Britain, France and Israel did not succeed.
After the Anglo-French-Israeli attack was launched on Egypt the Americans
played a leading role in the United Nations in condemning Britain’s role and
the Americans demanded British withdrawal from Egyptian soil.
Eden should
have learnt from the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company and the crisis that followed: i.e. that Great Britain could not act
militarily without the United States’ concurrence. The Suez crisis only
underlined that Britain could not act without the assistance of the United
States. Whereas the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s crisis showed the limited
range of action Britain could take. It indicated that the United Kingdom
could not act militarily in the Middle East without consultation with the
United States.
The Suez
crisis has been described (by Anthony Nutting amongst others) as
having taught Britain ‘no end of a lesson’. Certainly it demonstrated the
limitations of British power in the Middle East. But it is arguable that the
Iranian crisis – or crises – of 1950-54 had already laid bare the shaky
foundations on which British diplomacy, and her capacity for military
intervention in support of her diplomatic aims, rested. The British were, at
the bottom, confronted with three choices: to acquiesce in the Iranian
Government’s policy; to intervene militarily; or to use subterfuge to topple
Musaddiq’s government. In the end she pursued, and succeeded in achieving,
the third option, but only when the United States of
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