British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.
forthcoming
General Election on his mind, was under strong pressure from the
Conservatives, the Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, the Defence
Minister, Emmanuel Shinwell, to take military action. Furthermore, the Chief
of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Slim, Lord Fraser, the First
Sea Lord, and Sir Francis Shepherd, the British Ambassador to Teheran,
called for military intervention. The United States’ President Truman asked
his personal advisor, Averell Harriman, to mediate in the dispute. The
Truman administration was firmly in favour of negotiations to settle the
crisis. The American Government was worried by the possibility of a
communist takeover in Iran. The Truman Administration’s view was that a
British military attack would become a pretext for Soviet intervention in
Iran. The problem was complicated by the Korean War which had used up so
much of the United States’ military strength that she had no manpower to
cope with such a Soviet move. Furthermore, commitment of the American forces
to protect Western Europe during the Cold War under the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO), also added to the pressure of lack of manpower.
By the end of
1951, Britain was already in the grip of severe economic and
industrial difficulties. Britain was in a sterling crisis. The British
Government was planning to request economic assistance from the United
States. The British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh Gaitskell, firmly
opposed taking military action to retake the Abadan oil facilities on the
ground that such an operation would be expensive for the British economy.
Moreover, he was going to ask the United States, who were against taking
military action, for economic aid. Financial considerations prevailed. Prime
Minister Attlee took a firm stand against the use of force. Economic
sanctions and taking measures to blockade the Iranian oil were enforced. The
British Government put the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s dispute to the
International Court of Justice. Also a British mission headed by Richard
Stokes, Lord Privy Seal, and Minister of Materials, visited
144
Iran, as a
result of the intervention of Averell Harriman, President
Truman’s personal advisor.
The Stokes
mission failed. The Stokes mission failed because, while offering
the Iranians nationalisation and the withdrawal of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company, it wanted to secure British management of the oil operation. This
was not acceptable to the Iranian Prime Minister, Dr. Musaddiq. The Iranian
Prime Minister insisted that the British and Iranian staff in the industry
should be employed under a direct contract with the National Iranian Oil
Company. The British Government subsequently submitted the case of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to the Security Council of the United Nations. The
removal of Dr. Musaddiq, the Iranian Prime Minister, became the British
Government’s prime objective. The Truman administration, as has been said,
was of the opinion that a British military action would become a pretext for
the Soviet Union to intervene, and the dispute between Britain and Iran
should be settled by negotiations. The Americans became involved as a
mediator in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company conflict because of the financial
considerations, the United Kingdom also welcomed the International Bank’s
mediation. The loss of Iranian oil was forcing the United Kingdom to spend
25 per cent of her dollar earnings on oil supplies. The British Government,
therefore, was seeking the International Bank’s help. The American
mediation, and the International Bank’s mediation, respectively, failed. In
the American mediation, the British were determined that the handling of
Iranian oil must not be shared with anyone else except under British
control. The Iranians were equally intransigent in their determination that
no foreign organisation must be involved in the handling of the Iranian oil
industry, giving way would compromise the principle of nationalisation. The
American mediation failed. In the International Bank’s mediation Dr.
Musaddiq wanted the Bank to act on behalf of the Iranian Government, within
the nationalisation law, and the
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