British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

stable
conditions for its production, in the Persian Gulf in the context of
the rising power of the United States. As was argued in Chapter Six, to
protect British interests in the Persian Gulf for economic and defensive
reasons Britain, in co- operation with the United States, as she was the
only country which was able to withstand the Soviet Union and communist
pressure, prevented the Soviet Union from reaching to the oil reserves of
the Persian Gulf. The American Government was of the opinion that developing
close economic and political relations with Iran, the most powerful state in
the Persian Gulf, with its huge population and industrialisation programme,
would serve Western interests better. Direct rule,
in the United States’ view, in an area as strategically crucial as the
Persian Gulf with its huge oil reserves, could potentially lead to
confrontation with the Soviet Union. The British Government’s view on the
defence of the Persian Gulf was also similar to that of the United States.
The British view was that the armed forces of Iran should have capabilities
beyond those of internal security. As was shown in Chapter Six, Iran was to
be given aid and arms in the role of the buffer zone between the threat
posed by the Soviet Union, and the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

The Iranian
oil crisis of 1951 was as crucial as the Suez Canal crisis five
years later. It too was a challenge to Britain’s world authority, yet at the
same time it was not seen as a precipitous decline in British power. In
retrospect the historian might take a rather different point of view.

Following the
nationalisation of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian Government
in 1956, however; Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, was of the
opinion that, during the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s crisis, Britain had to
offer the United States a share in the new oil consortium for their co-
operation. During the Suez crisis Sir Anthony Eden did not want another
American involvement which might lead to further United States’ influence in
the Middle East, as was the case in the aftermath of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company’s crisis.

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