British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.
British
interests through extending his well-known policy of
subordinate alliances to the state contiguous to India on the west.
Lord Wellesley, therefore, sent a mission to Teheran, the capital of
Persia, in order to negotiate agreements to secure the exclusion of
French influence. The envoy induced the Shah of Persia, Fath Ali
Shah, into promising armed assistance to the British in the event of
a French advance towards the Persian Gulf. This was later reinforced
by a British person this time, as the first mission was headed by a
Persian, working for the East India Company. The Governor-General of
India sent Captain (later General Sir) John Malcolm to Teheran. As a
result of active diplomatic efforts, as the Shah of Persia was in no
mood to co-operate with the British to the degree that the British
wished, Malcolm was to settle two treaties with Persia, one was
political and the other was commercial. By virtue of the political
engagement the contracting parties agreed to concert measures for
joint defence in the event of a French move towards the Persian
Gulf. The commercial treaty embodied several measures seeking to
encourage trade between the two countries.5
The British Government’s
alliance with Persia was primarily, as far
as
Persia was
concerned, an instrument to be used against Russia.
However, when in 1800 St. Petersburg annexed Georgia, a territory
over which the Persian Emperor had control, Britain refused to reply
to Persia’s call for assistance. This British action was
consequential of a renewed French drive to incorporate the country
within her sphere of influence. Consequently the Persian Emperor,
Fath Ali Shah, turned to France for help. Napoleon was only too
willing to extend protection to a country which could serve as a
base for operations against India. 6
5. J.B. KELLY, Britain and
the Persian Gulf, 1795-1880,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).
6. Ibid.
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