British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

the time
it came to the Majlis on 22nd October 1946 the situation in
Azerbaijan had changed. Soviet troops had at last gone and the
Iranian Government took vigorous action to suppress the autonomous
regime and restore authority. The concession was rejected in the
Majlis by 102 votes to 2.

At the same time a law was
passed laying down a national oil policy.
It provided that:

1. The negotiations with
   the Soviet Union regarding an oil
   concession were null and void.

2. Henceforth nо
   concessions were to be granted to foreign
   countries nor would foreign partners be used in exploration
   for oil.

3. Iran would alone
   finance and carry out its Own exploration
   programme; if this resulted in commercial finds within five
   years, the Government might negotiate an agreement for the
   sale of oil to the Soviet Union.

4. The Government was to
   negotiate with existing concessions to
   protect the national rights.

Following the dispute of
Iran over oil with the Soviet Union, in
1947 tentative requests were being made in Iran for a revision of
the 1933 Agreement, which was described above.6

Before going any further,
it should be stressed that it has been,
and is, important to give a brief account of events leading up to
the 1951 crisis. These include the pre-war period, during and after
the Second World War. The reason is that, by doing so, an
understanding of the background to the crisis which confronted the
British Government, regarding the AIOC, the biggest overseas British
enterprise and the main British interest in the Persian Gulf, can be
made.