British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

Iran and the oil question,
1945-1951

Post-war
oil production in Iran had been moving up, from 19.2
million tons in 1945 to nearly 20.2 million in 1946 and on its way
toward 24.9 million in 1947, but there was as yet no certainty that
this trend would continue. Meanwhile, AIOC was hesitant about how
far it could safely go to improve the level of payments to Iran.
7

Real negotiations did not
get underway until the autumn of 1948.
They were then wide-ranging, with complaints on the Iranian side
against almost every aspect of the Company’s commercial and
employment policies. The Iranian economy was under considerable
pressure. A seven-year plan had been drawn up for the period 1949-56
and royalties were the only conceivable way to finance it. The plan
was a long-term programme, providing for heavy expenditure on
infrastructure and on social improvements, for example, in
education. It was therefore not likely to produce short-term
economic gains, but these were just what the Iranian people, and
most likely the Majlis, expected from it. 8

The new complaints had
emerged on the Iranian side. The first was
that Venezuela had negotiated an oil concession agreement giving it
a 50:50 share in profits, and the Iranians saw no reason why they
should not have the same. This was an idea which the British Foreign
Secretary, Ernest Bevin, had much earlier put privately to the AIOC.
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who handled the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company’s crisis before Herbert Morrison took office as Foreign
Secretary, was emphatic that Britain’s position as a great power
must remain. Bevin’s view on this issue was also held by his
successor, Herbert