British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

Kuwaiti
oil, and certain that the ruler of Kuwait would have the
greatest objection to such an agreement.

The other complaint was
over the gold price used to calculate AIOC’s
tonnage royalties. This was stipulated in the 1933 Agreement to be
the official price of gold, which post-war meant the price used by
the IMF, but the market value of gold was much higher in the bazaars
of Teheran than in New York or London. Altogether the Iranians felt
they were being cheated, both over their royalty income and over
their dividend-related receipts.

‘The Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company should advance to the Persian
Government £10 million on the account of future oil royalties,’
requested the Iranian Government.14 In 1948
the British Government, ‘received in profits and taxation twice the
amount which had accrued to the Persian Government.’
15 Despite all these problems, the AIOC did
eventually negotiate a package of offers:

The agreement did not
really alter the 1933 Agreement (which was
outlined earlier). Payments under item (i) were increased from 4s,
to 6s gold and under item (ii) to 1s gold. Item (iii) was also
altered in Persia’s favour to provide for an immediate payment to
the Government in respect of the sum standing at General Reserve at
31st December 1947, and further payment (equal to 20%) in respect of
allocations to General Reserve thereafter. It was further provided
that these payments should