British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

merely
staved off the issue by presenting the Agreement to the newly
elected Majlis and allowing it to be referred to a special
commission of the Majlis which, though it was supposed to contain
equal representation of the various factions in the house, in fact
contained five members of the National Front in its total membership
of 18. Mansur later fell from office and was replaced by General
Razmara. 18

General
Razmara was reluctant to give the Supplemental Agreement
support, and his public references to it were in equal terms. ‘The
Bill embodying the Agreement therefore remained with the Majlis Oil
Commission which, in November 1950, recommended to the Majlis that
it did not sufficiently serve Persian interests.’
19 The Oil Committee of the Majlis was chaired
by Dr. Musaddiq. It rejected the Supplemental Agreement in
December 1950. The final blow to the Supplemental Agreement’s
chances came when the Arabian- American Oil Company (ARAMCO)
reached a 50:50 profit sharing agreement with the Saudi
Government, which was announced in December 1950.

Meanwhile on 10th February
the Company, in order to strengthen
Razmara’s hand, not only informed him that they were ready to
negotiate an entirely new agreement based on an equal sharing of
profits, but offered him substantial monetary support (£5 million
at once and £2 million a month for ten months, all in advance of
future royalties) in order to assist the Persian Government in their
immediate financial difficulties. Razmara preferred, however, not to
reveal this offer to the Oil Commission and the Majlis and attempted
to enact a nationalisation resolution in another way. He appeared
before