British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

The oil
refinery at Abadan represented not only wealth but also that
intangible in Britain’s presence in the Middle East, ‘prestige’. In
the words of the British Resident in Kuwait. Francis Pelly, ‘Abadan
stood for something… huge, a symbol which not even the most
sceptical Arab could deny of British energy, British wealth, British
efficiency and British industrial might.’ 32

The oil
refinery at Abadan was the largest in the world. Equally
crucial, the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was
also an embarrassment the British Government due to the following
reasons. There was, of course, the perceived centrality of the
Persian Gulf, as Britain’s ‘life line’ in the Commonwealth strategic
defence system. This was reaffirmed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee
on 30th March1951, which emphasised again the vital aspects of
British defence considerations in the Persian Gulf in terms of the
air and sea communication links in the area; the treaty of
obligations Britain had towards Iraq, Jordan and other Arab states;
the need to preserve North Africa from communism or Russian
aggression; and the role of the Persian Gulf (air) bases as a
springboard for offensive and strategic air action in the event of
global war. This premise remained as unshakeable in the minds of the
Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence as it had been in
1945.33

The nationalisation of
Iranian oil confronted the Labour Cabinet of
1951,

headed by
Clement Attlee, with a dilemma. They had themselves
nationalised more industries than any previous government in British
history, including the entire coal mining industry, which like
Iranian oil, was then the country’s main

  1. LOUIS,
    Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism and Oil, (London: I.B.
    Tauris and Co. Ltd., Publishers, 1988), pp. 229 -230.
  2. J. CABLE, Intervention at Abadan: Plan
    Buccaneer
    ,
    (London: Macmillan, 1992), Chapters 5, 6,7.

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