British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

matter may
prejudice our interests throughout the Middle East.’
38 For example, ‘any admission of the principle
of the nationalisation would be quickly exploited elsewhere in
the Middle East: the Egyptian Government in particular, would be
glad to seize this pretext for actions prejudicial to British
interests, ‘
39 went on Herbert Morrison.

As far as Clement Attlee,
the Labour Prime Minister, was concerned,
‘Persian oil’ was an election issue. To preside over the Cabinet
meeting, Attlee broke away from the Scottish Labour Conference and
flew to London Contrary to Morrison the Foreign Secretary, who took
a hawkish approach and favoured military
intervention in Iran, Attlee estimated that military intervention
might strengthen nationalist feeling in Iran and consequently Dr.
Musaddiq’s position as a Prime Minister who could stand up to
western imperialism. Furthermore, Attlee was of the opinion that, if
the Iranians by their own mismanagement were

to reduce the oil industry
to chaos, then they might eventually
recognise the desirability of British co-operation. Attlee was not
especially sanguine about that prospect, but he held it to be the
best that the British faced. He put these views forward with great
force:

An occupation of Abadan
island would not necessarily bring about a
change in Persian Government and might well unite the Persian people
against this country, and neither the oil wells nor the refinery
could be worked without the assistance of Persian workers… It
would be humiliating to this country if the remaining British staff
at Abadan were expelled, but this step would at least leave Dr.
Musaddiq with the task of attempting to run the oil industry with
inadequate facilities for refining oil