British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

In May
1951, Attlee warned the Iranian Government that
‘nationalisation would have serious consequences’.3

With tension rising around
the oil installations at Abadan, and
fears of harm to British property and personnel, as early as 10th
May 1951, Herbert Morrison, the Foreign Secretary, considered the
option of possible military intervention. The British position in
the Middle East depends on her ability to maintain her position in
Iran, was the view of Morrison. On 15th May, Morrison announced that
British paratroops were being held in readiness in the UK to protect
the illegal seizure of British property. The Foreign Secretary had
the Navy send a destroyer, HMS Mauritius, to lie off Abadan, but it
had orders merely to stand by in case British lives became at risk.
The threat to use force in defence of British property was not again
mentioned by the Foreign Secretary and the paratroops got no nearer
to Iran than Cyprus.

Although the British
prepared themselves for military action against
Iran, in May 1951, but settling the crisis by negotiation became the
preferred option.

The United Kingdom is
endeavouring to reach a negotiating position
with the Persian Government with a view to ensuring both that our
oil supplies are guaranteed and that AIOC is able to continue
effective operations in Persia.4

The Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company and the British Government in the
meanwhile had accepted the fact of the nationalisation, but wanted
to secure continued control of the oil operation and continued
possession of the oil produced. The British Government took legal
steps. At the end of the May 1951, the British Government appealed
to the International Court of Justice to adjudicate on the legality
of Iran’s act of nationalisation.