British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

President
Truman’s obejctions to the use of force in Persia had
become prohibitive.8

Attlee
was under strong pressure from the Tories, as well as form
those within the government such as Morrison and Emmanuel Shinwell
(now Minister of Defence) to take a stronger line. Churchill told
Attlee that he ‘had never thought that the Persian oil fields could
be held by force, but that Abadan Island was quite another matter
‘.9

Though, as was said,
negotiation to settle the dispute was genuinely
the option that was preferred by the British, nevertheless the
military option had been kept in the background. A paper was
circulated to the Cabinet, by Morrison, on 20th July 1951,
explaining that the Chiefs of Staff believed that Abadan could be
taken on short notice and could be held against Iranian resistance.
A plan evolved, code named MIDGET, later replaced by BUCCANEER, as
MIDGET appeared in the early stages of planning to have little or no
chance of success. BUCCANEER, however, was thought to have a high
rate of success, and could hold the island of Abadan indefinitely.
The Chiefs of Staff were in tough mood. On 17th July 1951, Field
Marshal Slim, the CIGS, urged the need to retain military control at
Abadan as long as possible. The alternative would be a massive loss
of British prestige, which would play into the hands of the
Russians. Lord Fraser, the First Sea Lord, impatiently expressed his
desire for military action.

The ultimate objective of
UK policy in the dispute between the
Persian Government and AIOC is a satisfactory agreement which will