British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

1. ensure that Persia
   remains non-communist;

2. maintain the flow of oil through control by a British
   company;

3. safeguard the UK balance of payments;

4. not injure UK interests
   in other countries.10

The
Attorney-General, Sir Frank Soskice, sharply criticised the
basis of Morrison’s argument in international law. According to him,
military force could be authorised only in the last resort, if lives
were visibly in physical danger. Though the Persian Gulf squadron
had been strengthened by three frigates and five destroyers from the
Mediterranean, nevertheless by the end of July the Cabinet agreed to
resume negotiations with Iran. Sir Frank Soskice’s comment coincided
with the American effort to end the crisis peacefully. On 1st August
1951 Lord Fraser approved the abandoning of BUCCANEER and Mauritius
was withdrawn from the Persian Gulf.

In the meanwhile, President
Truman was making efforts to bring about
a peaceful solution to the crisis. On 8th June he suggested that
Averell Harriman, the Personal Advisor to the President, should
visit Teheran to find a common ground for negotiations. Harriman,
during his discussion with Dr. Musaddiq which took place as soon as
he arrived in Teheran on 15th July, first pointed out that Iran must
treat the International Court of Justice’s order with all possible
consideration.

The Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company, as pointed out before, in May 1951
asked for arbitration by the International Court of Justice. The
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company nominated its arbitrator, Lord Radcliffe,
and asked the Iranian