British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

While
this basis appeared to give a chance for negotiations, the
British Government decided that it was unlikely that the
negotiations would have a positive outcome unless the Iranian
Government first undertook to improve the conditions in South Iran
which had got worse in July.

Averell Harriman took the
decision to fly to London in order to hold
talks with the British Government. After, discussions in London,
Harriman returned to Iran. He had further talks with Dr. Musaddiq in
Teheran. Harriman then contacted the British Government, in order to
assure them that Dr. Musaddiq recognised the necessity for improving
the atmosphere, particularly in South Iran, and also to explain that
the Iranian Government had agreed to negotiate on the basis of the
law of 20th March 1951. As was mentioned in Chapter Two, on 20th
March 1951, the Majlis approved the Oil Committee’s recommendation
for the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

After the assassination of
the Iranian Prime Minister, Razmara (as
Chapter Two showed, Razmara appeared before the Oil Commission which
was chaired by Dr. Musaddiq and gave a report from the Iranian
technical, financial and legal experts against the nationalisation
of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This show of opposition to the
nationalisation of the Company led to his assassination a few days
later), on 7th March the

Oil Commission lost no time
in passing its resolution ‘accepting the
proposal that oil should be nationalised throughout Persia’ and
requesting an extension of the Commission’s mandate for two months
for examination of the principle of nationalisation. The Majlis
agreed to consider this resolution as a matter of ‘double urgency’
and it was approved by both Houses by the 20th March.
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