British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

Furthermore, Harriman wanted to reassure the British that Iran would
not insist on the application of the Nationalisation Law of 1st May.
(On 1st May it became the law. On 2nd May the AIOC was proclaimed
nationalised).

On the 26th April, i.e. in
considerably less than two months, Dr.
Musaddiq, the Chairman of the Oil Commission suddenly called a
meeting and expressed his intention of pressing for a decision on
the question of nationalisation. The following day the Commission
approved the text of a resolution enjoining the implementation of
the ‘decision of the Houses of Parliament for oil nationalisation
throughout the country’ and setting out in 9 articles the method of
implementation. Once again this resolution (the so-called ‘9-point
law’) was hustled through the Majlis and it received the approval of
both Houses by the 30th April. The Shah promulgated the law on 2nd
May .14

When the
British Government received sufficient assurances, it sent
the Iranian Government, with the agreement of Harriman, a note. This
note accepted the basis which was put to Dr. Musaddiq on 24th July
by Harriman, as was explained earlier. It also pointed out that ‘the
negotiations could not be conducted in a satisfactory manner unless
the present atmosphere was relieved.’
15 Furthermore, the British Government as
well as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in the note recognised ‘the
principle of the nationalisation of the oil industry in Persia.’
16 In reply the government of Iran for their
part ‘recognised the need for creating the best possible atmosphere
in the interests of success of the negotiations.’
17