British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

maintain
the British technical staff and to have a high standard
operating organisation, substantially under British control, in
which British technical staff could have confidence.

The Iranian Government in a
statement announced that the proposal
did not conform to the formula on the basis of which negotiations
had been begun and refused to discuss these proposals. The
government of Iran only wanted to hold talks on:

1. The purchase of oil to meet the United
   Kingdom’s own
   requirements.

2. Examination of the
   compensation to be paid to the AIOC.

3. The employment of
   British technicians by the NIOC.20

   The
   British Government did not agree with these three points
   because accepting them meant in effect complying with the
   terms of the oil nationalisation law of 1st May 1951.

   Dr. Musaddiq in his
   private negotiations with the Lord Privy
   Seal showed interest in further discussion in order to
   formulate a purchasing organisation, however, he insisted
   that the British and Persian staff in the industry should be
   employed under a direct contract with the National Iranian
   Oil Company, and that there was, thus, no room for the
   operating organisation. Musaddiq had held to his principle
   saying that the British proposal would mean that ‘the
   servant would be bigger than the master’.21 Despite Harriman’s support for Stokes’
   plan it became clear that Musaddiq was not going to
   accept any of these and Lord Privy Seal as a result
   decided to suspend negotiations and left for London on
   23rd August 1951. Harriman, President Truman’s envoy,
   left two days later.

   The British Government,
   as a result of Richard Stokes’
   withdrawal, regarded the negotiations as suspended.
   Musaddiq, in his speech in the Senate on 5th September,
   stated that if the British Government did not return a
   satisfactory