British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

request.
Consequently, the Minister of Court on 19th September
brought the British Ambassador a letter unsigned and without any
date, apparently from Dr. Musaddiq, making further suggestions for a
settlement. The proposals in this letter represented some
advancement on Musaddiq’s previous offers, but were wholly
unsatisfactory in regard to the all-important question of the
position of the British staff. The British Government wasted no time
in announcing that the proposals were unacceptable as a basis for
negotiations, as it seemed that the principal objective of Musaddiq
in putting forward these suggestions was to say in the Majlis that
he was in negotiation with the British Government.

Without any notice to the
British Government, on 25th September, the
government of Iran announced that the remaining British staff in
Abadan would be given seven days notice to leave Iran. This action
marked the final severance of the British connection with Iranian
oil. Though on 1st August 1951, as has been said, the plan for
taking military action was withdrawn, however the expulsion notice
of the Iranian Government to the British staff in Abadan, once more,
revived the idea of military action within the British Government.

The British Cabinet, now
concerned about the prospects of the
forthcoming general election, contemplated taking military action.
Herbert Morrison, the British Foreign Secretary, continued to be
attracted by the prospect of using force to protect British
interests. On 27th September 1951 the British Cabinet met. The
Foreign Secretary presented a powerful case. Morrison mentioned to
his Cabinet colleagues.

The British Government had
acted with great reasonableness in the
face of much provocation. If they allowed the remaining British
staff to be thrown out, there would be repercussions throughout the
world.25