British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

in 1951,
to what they perceived as a major threat to British
interests, will be followed.

There was, however, a
continuity of the Foreign Office or the
‘official mind’ between the Labour and Conservative Governments. The
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s crisis was a case of vital national
interest, over-riding the doctrinal differences of the Labour and
Conservative Governments. The continuity was not because there was
so little doctrinal difference about the Empire, it must be
emphasised.

As the Conservative Prime
Minister Benjamin Disraeli once said,
‘governments found most of their legislation in the pigeon-holes of
their predecessors.’ 10 This was the case
with regard to the handling of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s
crisis under the Conservative Government of 1951. To expand on this
point, it is important to return to the Labour Government briefly.
As Professor Partha Gupta has said, ‘an oversimplified or
sentimental view of the Labour’s Commonwealth and colonial policy
should not be taken.’ 11 He continued by
pointing out that ‘considerations of national and imperial
self-interest, especially in relation to… the needs of the British
economy, helped to determine Labour’s policy.’
12 Shrewd economic considerations were targeted,
by the Labour Government, at safeguarding and protecting the
huge and well established prestige, way of life, culture,
strategic basis, trade investments and diplomatic influences on
which Britain’s role had rested.

To safeguard British
interests, Labour came up with a diffused
method of

control in
order to maintain the imperial connections and influence.
Having always believed that Britain would improve the economic and
social conditions in spheres under her domination, and bring
prosperity to them, the Labour