British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

Eastern
resources were under US control, as against 80% which was
under British control. By 1945, however, the situation was
different. The American share had increased to 55%, while Britain’s
share had reduced to 41%. Later on came the substantial deals
between the AIOC and the major American companies, still further
expanding American control, and the rapid growth of the Arabian-
American Oil (ARAMCO)’s production in Saudi Arabia. To the
Americans,

Even the mere elimination
of the British company in Persia would
helpful, and its substitution by an American concern would be better
still. And if it could be justified on the moral grounds of stopping
communism, the other less respectable aspects could be
overlooked.19

The Anglo-American rivalry
in the Middle East arose from a natural
British feeling of resentment at what they considered to be American
poaching on their private reserves.20

The
previous chapter showed that the Iranian Prime Minister, Dr.
Musaddiq, flew to New York in October 1951 to set out the Iranian
case. The United States Government seized on his presence in the USA
as an opportunity, and intensive talks were held with him in October
and November. After the sessions of the Security Council,
discussions began in Washington with high level American diplomats,
with the occasional presence of Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze, but
most of the negotiations were carried out between Musaddiq and
George McGhee. It was estimated that McGhee spent 72 hours in
discussion with Dr. Musaddiq. President Truman also participated in
the talks.

McGhee and Musaddiq
eventually, after a lot of effort, worked out a
proposal to solve the impasse. The McGhee-Musaddiq proposal included
the following points: