British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

A
national Iranian oil company would be established and
would be responsible for the exploration, production and
transportation of crude oil.

The Abadan refinery
would be sold to a non-British firm
which would select its own technicians.

The AIOC would
establish a purchasing organisation to buy,
ship and market Iranian oil.

The contract would be
in effect for 15 years and would
provide for a minimum of 30 million tons of oil a year.

The price of
petroleum would be determined through
negotiations between Iran and Britain and would not exceed
1.10$ per barrel.21

The
$1.10 per barrel was 65 cents less than the Persian Gulf
price of $1.75. This was regarded as compensation for the
nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. ‘The final
result of this pricing scheme would in fact have closely
approximated the fifty-fifty profit-sharing arrangement then
in effect in Saudi Arabia.’ 22 The
United States officials were optimistic that the terms would
be an acceptable foundation for negotiation to the new
Conservative Government in the United Kingdom. Anthony Eden,
the British Foreign Secretary, met on five separate
occasions with American officials to discuss the proposal.
The British Foreign Secretary found the nationalisation
principle unacceptable. The exclusion of British technicians
from Iran was another requirement that upset the British.

Nevertheless, Acheson
still urged settlement, but Eden
contended that it had to include the principle of