British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

1. fair and full impartial
   compensation;

2. security for effective
   payment;

3. comparability of
   contractual terms; and

4. no discrimination.23

Musaddiq’s attitude was
that,

there could be no
employment of a foreign organisation en bloc to
handle any of the processes involved in the oil industry; nor could
any one organisation have a monopoly of the marketing of Persian
oil. To give way on either of these points would be to betray the
whole principle of nationalisation. 24

On the other hand the British

were equally intransigent
in their determination not to share the
handling of Persian oil with any other group except under controlled
conditions satisfactory to themselves. Least of all were they
prepared to compete in the open market with other distributors of
oil from the same source.25

These two
views were irreconcilable, and neither side saw any
particular reason to make concessions. Dean Acheson, the United
States Secretary of State, telephoned the Department of State from
Paris after his final meeting with Anthony Eden, and asked to inform
Dr. Musaddiq who was waiting in the US for results of talks with
Eden, that the British had rejected the proposal. Dr. Musaddiq