British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

intervention to save him from having to take direct action against
Musaddiq. The public statements of the Persian Government, however,
are not propitious. In a recent speech in the Majlis Musaddiq,
referring to his discussions with Mr. Garner (the Vice-President of
the International Bank), intimated that the Bank would only be
intervening to help Persia, finance her industry and sell her oil,
not to control or manage it as trustee for the parties. It is too
early yet, however, to say that Musaddiq has adopted a firm
attitude. It is essential that the independent role of the Bank in
this matter should be publicly emphasised at every opportunity.39

The
British Government was worried that the International Bank’s
proposals, in terms of presentation and timing, would not strengthen
Musaddiq’s political position in Iran. The United Kingdom did not
want Musaddiq to appear as if he was in negotiation over the oil
question, since Musaddiq’s political status had become weak at home,
due to the breakdown of talks with the Americans. Therefore Anthony
Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, recommended the following
measures:

1. In
   public we should be well advised to maintain silence and
   apparent indifference to the fate of Persian oil, while in
   private we should do all we can to assist and encourage the
   Bank in drawing up a plan.

2. Any specific
   proposals from the Bank should, in the first
   instance, be communicated to the Persian and British
   Ambassadors in Washington, requesting