British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

written
statements from their Governments that they accept them as a
basis for negotiations.

1. His Majesty’s
   Government’s reply to such proposals should
   not be published until a satisfactory reply has been
   received from Musaddiq, and our public comment should be
   confined to a statement that the proposals were being
   seriously considered but the outcome must depend on whether
   the Persian Government accepts the proposal as a basis for
   discussion.40

The
British Government was in favour of intervention by the
International Bank. Firstly, the loss of Persian oil was forcing
Britain to spend some 25% of her dollar earnings on oil supplies, a
problem in which ironically she was seeking the Bank’s help.
Secondly, the Persian oil dispute was a threat to the economic
stability of the Middle East.

However,
while the International Bank was tryin to work out a
comprehensive plan to incorporate as much as possible of the demands
of the two parties, Dr. Musaddiq expressed opposition at a press
conference 26th December 1951, to the reported terms of the
International Bank’s plan. In particular, hostility was directed
towards the re-engagement of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
technicians, and selling oil to Britain at a discount on the
international rate. On 31st December 1951, however, an International
Bank mission arrived in Teheran headed by Hector Prudhomme, director
of the International Bank’s loan department, and Torkild Rieber,
petroleum advisor to the International Bank.

A few
days before the arrival of the International Bank’s delegation
in Teheran, a strong demonstration against a solution of the oil
problem by recourse