British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

to the
International Bank had taken place there. Therefore, the
delegation were not optimistic that their mission would have a
positive outcome. In their first meeting with Musaddiq, the
representatives of the Vice-President of the Bank were told that the
Bank’s proposals must be within the framework of the nationalisation
law. However, the delegation still pressed ahead, and submitted the
memorandum which they had brought with them from Robert L. Garner,
the Vice-President of the International Bank. The contents of the
memorandum were not new. They were similar to what the British
Government had anticipated, which was mentioned earlier in this
chapter, such as, the oil industry would be run by a neutral board
of management, selected by the International Bank completely
responsible for it. Moreover, items like, the International Bank
would have total powers in the engagement and discharge of
personnel, and in all other matters related with the operation of
the industry. Finally, the Bank would make a bulk export contract
from the sale of oil through established distribution channels, and
the profits would be divided into three, one to Iran, one to the
foreign bulk producers, and one to be held in reserve by the Bank.

On 3rd
January 1952, Dr. Musaddiq rejected the Vice-President of the
International Bank’s proposals, on the basis that the bank could
intervene in the operation of the oil industry in Iran only as an
agent of the Iranian Government. Furthermore, the Iranian Government
would not share the profits with the purchasers of oil.

No
progress could be expected so long as the Persian Government
insisted that the International Bank should operate only Iran’s
account.41