British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

Dr.
Musaddiq’s response nearly brought about the collapse of the
negotiations. However, after discussions with the joint oil
committee and the American Ambassador, Musaddiq climbed down and
agreed to continue the talks on general lines, and it was suggested
that the delegation visit Abadan while waiting for further news from
Washington. The attitude was maintained, thereafter, that the
mission was only a fact-finding mission, and when it left on 13th
January 1952, it was only to report to the International Bank. ‘The
UK is entirely willing to have the Bank to continue to play the hand
which has been started,’ 42 said Eden.

Robert
Garner, the Vice-President of the International Bank, on 4th
February 1952, sent a telegram to Musaddiq indicating that he would
like to visit Iran himself in an attempt to reach a compromise.
Musaddiq, the Iranian Prime Minister, sent the Vice-President a
welcoming reply. On 11th February, the vice- President, Robert
Garner, arrived in Teheran. Accompanying him were Prudhomme, Rieber,
Ellsworth Clark, legal advisor, and Samuel Lipkowitz, economic
advisor.

The
Iranian Government insisted to the mission that it would be
impossible to re-engage any technicians who had previously served in
Iran, in view of the circumstances of their departure. The mission
argued that in view of the prevailing shortage of experts, it would
be out of the question to find, except in the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company, the thousand or so technicians required to operate the
industry. In reply the Iranian Government produced evidence to
indicate that the industry could be run at at least one-third of its
capacity without any foreign technicians at all. On the question of
price, the Iranian Government not only dismissed any suggestion of
profit sharing, but was extremely reluctant