British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

discount.
Though extensive discussions between the Iranian officials
and the International Bank’s officials subsequently took place in
Teheran, no progress was made. On 16th March 1952, the Iranian
Government and the International Bank indicated that no agreement
could be reached on several important points. The Iranian Government
and the International Bank confirmed that the important issues were,
firstly, management; secondly, British technicians; and thirdly, oil
prices. In a telegram the Iranian Prime Minister, Dr. Musaddiq,
indicated that two conditions would meet Iranian requirements. One,
the operating staff should come from neutral countries, and two, the
International Bank should be acting on behalf of the Iranian
Government and in accordance with the nationalisation laws, in any
period managing the industry. The Iranian Government was specially
emphatic that this should apply in the case of the engagement and
dismissal of staff.

The
underpinning reason for disagreeing with the International Bank
was a deep Iranian understanding of the true nature of the
International Bank’s intervention and motives. The Iranians
considered themselves a small nation that had so long been exploited
by stronger nations from the west, and no international scheme with
such sponsoring could be altruistic.

Anthony
Eden was unhappy about the latest developments in the
discussions concerning the future of the Iranian oil industry. In
Cabinet he remarked that

He was
not unduly disappointed by the breakdown in the negotiations
by the International Bank. This might well weaken the political
position of the Persian Prime Minister.43