British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

Eden’s
opinion of Musaddiq was ‘one of the shrewdest and most
devious “Orientals” he had ever encountered’.44 On interviews with Musaddiq, Eden
commented
in his memoirs that they ‘did not advance us one jot’.
45 The British Government was not
hopeful that the crisis would be settled with Musaddiq.

On 20th
March 1952, the State Department of the United States
announced that the Iranian Government could not have the $120,
000,000 loan for which Musaddiq, the Iranian Prime Minister, had
asked in Washington. The reason was, because it had the opportunity
of getting substantial funds from its oil resources.

However,
fear of an economic collapse in Iran and the likelihood of
a Soviet takeover, ‘in a strategically significant area’,46 made the US policy on the
question of aid to
Iran ambiguous. To maintain stability in Iran, Truman and
Acheson continued with providing financial help to Iran. On 1st
April 1952,

$16,000,000 of aid was received in Iran from
the USA, only twelve
days after the

$120,000,000 loan had been turned down. On 24th April, American
military aid, which had lapsed on 8th January, was resumed.
Moreover, there had been, since November 1951, an American mission
in Iran, supervising the expenditure of a

$23,000,000 grant under the
Point Four declaration by President
Truman initiating the granting of technical aid to developing
countries. ‘The British were furious at this because they were
trying to use economic pressure to bring Musaddig to heel.’
47 The British could not see the relevance
of Iran to the problem of western defence.