British Diplomatic Oil Crisis: Contemporary Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical Rivalries in the Persian Gulf: Drawing a Lesson? Or Sir Anthony Eden‘s Delusion of Grandeur.

In the
meantime Musaddiq had been discussing with the Soviet
Ambassador the supply of oil to the Soviet Union. The United States
was convinced that, if the Iranian economy were allowed to collapse,
it

might
provide a pretext for a Soviet occupation, possibly by
invitation from Mossadeq’s leftist-inclined government. The whole
problem was compounded by the Korean War, which has so drained US
military strength that she had no more Power available to counter
such a Soviet move. 48

Commitment of the US forces to protect Western Europe during the
Cold War, under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), also
added to the pressure of lack of manpower.

The
British concerned to protect their interest in Iranian oil and
bringing down the Musaddiq government, and to safeguard their
economic interests in the Arab world also. Furthermore, avoiding the
possibility of forcing them to purchase dollar oil. The United
States Government, however, was worried about a direct Soviet
takeover of Iran. The Americans, therefore, continued to mediate in
the dispute.

In the
middle of May 1952, Brigadier-General Henry Byroade, the new
Assistant Secretary of State (George McGhee’s successor), visited
Iran. Byroade informed Musaddiq of America’s reluctance to continue
giving aid to Iran under Point Four, so long as Iran was not making
full use of her revenues. Attention was now directed towards the
International Court of Justice in the Hague. No more attempt was
made to reopen the subject of the Iranian oil for an ample period,
by which time the victories had come Musaddiq’s way. Firstly, he had
returned to office, having won the election in Iran. Secondly, Iran
had won her case at the International Court of Justice.