The British Imperial Establishment, Post Imperial Era, and the ‘Churchillian’ World View, 1945-2016. (Adjustments & Challenges in Contemporary British Diplomatic Strategy)

The British Imperial Establishment, Post Imperial Era, and the ‘Churchillian’ World View, 1945-2016. (Adjustments & Challenges in Contemporary British Diplomatic Strategy)

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C- Notice was given that
British assistance to Greece and Turkey had to

cease.

These
were viewed by the Americans as an indication of a certain loss of
imperial will or, alternatively, of
imperial muscle and money – the latter
interpretation being reinforced by British hints that an
economically ruined
Europe would never be able to resist Communism. The response of the
United
States is well-known: the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, pledging support
to friendly
states under threat, and the assumption of British responsibilities
towards Greece and Turkey by the
Americans were soon followed by the
announcement of the Marshall Aid Scheme for economic
reconstruction.

Bevin
also went on in his memorandum of the 4th January 1948 by saying,
“Material aid will have to come
principally from the United States, but the
countries of Western Europe which despise the spiritual
values of America will
look to us for political leadership and moral guidance and for assistance to
build
up a counter attraction to the baleful tenets of Communism within their borders
and in
recreating a healthy society wherever it has been shaken or shattered by
the war. I believe we have the
resources with which to perform this task.”44 Then,
in the
concluding paragraph, he said, “provided we can organise a Western
European system, backed by the
power and resources of the Commonwealth and
of the Americans, it should be possible to develop our own
power and influence
to equal that of the United States of America.”45

In
fact the Churchillian idea of Britain standing at the centre of three
interlocking circles: the Atlantic
Circle, the Commonwealth, and Western Europe
had always been shared by Bevin. “Bevin’s outlook
was unreservedly Atlanticist,
and any interest he may have shown in European unity sprang from his belief
in
the imperative necessity of obtaining an American commitment. All the available
evidence suggests
that from the beginning his policy was shaped towards this

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