The British Imperial Establishment, Post Imperial Era, and the ‘Churchillian’ World View, 1945-2016. (Adjustments & Challenges in Contemporary British Diplomatic Strategy)

152

foreign policy to Washington. This is how he viewed the situation while he was
Churchill’s
Foreign Secretary after the war. Eden had already had diplomatic
experience before he became Foreign
Secretary in the post-war period. He had
been Foreign Secretary in 1935-38 and 1940-45. Nevertheless he
was viewed by
his colleague as “in some ways an undiplomatic personality: capable of
great
charm but volatile in mood and often petulantly angry with events and people.”37
Moreover, in the 1930s, he had made his name as a determined opponent
of
appeasement. Finally, Eden, unlike Churchill, was not convinced that co-
operation with America
should be the over-riding priority of British policy. In his
speeches he always put the Empire and
Commonwealth first and the Atlantic
Alliance second. Eden stressed the importance of Britain’s
position as the heart
and centre of a great Empire and Commonwealth.

The
hope of partnership between Britain and America, or the “special
relationship”, as a result of
Eden’s dominant role following Churchill’s ill health
was dashed. After Churchill’s
resignation, Eden became Prime Minister. During
Eden’s premiership from 1955 to 1957, because of the
Suez Crisis of 1956 (which
arose as a result of Egypt’s nationalisation of the canal), the
relationship between
America and Britain reached its lowest in the twentieth century. The Suez
Canal
was the main route between Britain and her Empire, mainly India. After
India’s
independence it became the leading route by which two-thirds of the oil produced
in the
Persian Gulf was shipped, and thus the Suez Canal was strategically
important to Britain, W.Europe and
the U.S.. However, Britain had dominated
Egypt since the 1880s, and the Canal Zone was still, in the
1950s, important to
her military presence in the eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand,
America
had become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf following the nationalisation
of oil in
Iran, and, therefore, Eden did not wish an American involvement at this
time, in order to avoid any
situation that might result in greater American
influence in the area whilst diminishing the British
position. Consequently, Eden

Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213