The British Imperial Establishment, Post Imperial Era, and the ‘Churchillian’ World View, 1945-2016. (Adjustments & Challenges in Contemporary British Diplomatic Strategy)

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Nevertheless, with their leaders getting on well, co-operation between
Britain and the U.S.A. in
regard to defence, continued. After the war, as a matter
of helping to defend the Free World against
Communism, Britain also (with the
view to her own interests) played an active role in negotiating
post-war regional
pacts, all under the N.A.T.O. pact, such as S.E.A.T.O. (in south-east Asia) and

C.E.N.T.O. (the Baghdad
Pact). Moreover, during the decolonisation process,
bases in places such as Cyprus, Singapore, Gibraltar
and Aden were retained and
were shared with the Americans, under these pacts.

However, although there was a close relationship between the two
countries’ leaders, MacMillan
still distrusted the Americans and wanted an
insurance against the United States failing to honour its
nuclear guarantee of

N.A.T.O. (and pacts
under N.A.T.O.). He wanted an independent nuclear
capacity, i.e. controlled by Britain and belonging to
her. Therefore, MacMillan
embarked on a negotiating process that received opposition both at home and
in
America. Kennedy’s Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara, publicly criticised
such policy.
MacMillan brought considerable influence to bear on Kennedy.
Eventually, in December 1962, at the Nassau
Conference, the United States
agreed to sell Britain Polaris missiles to be fired from nuclear submarines
to be
built by Britain. In a major emergency affecting the United Kingdom alone, the
British
submarines could act under orders from London. The Polaris submarines
were less vulnerable than other
types of nuclear delivery system; and they would
not necessarily attract a nuclear retaliatory strike,
since they need not be based in
the United Kingdom. In addition, MacMillan had also acquired Polaris
on
favourable terms, with Britain obliged to make only a small contribution to
research and
development in addition to the price of each missile. The price that
Britain had to pay was de
Gaulle’s blocking of Britain’s entry into the E.E.C., the
third pillar of MacMillan’s policy
in view of protecting Britain’s power and
interests in the aftermath of Empire.

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