The British Imperial Establishment, Post Imperial Era, and the ‘Churchillian’ World View, 1945-2016. (Adjustments & Challenges in Contemporary British Diplomatic Strategy)

The British Imperial Establishment, Post Imperial Era, and the ‘Churchillian’ World View, 1945-2016. (Adjustments & Challenges in Contemporary British Diplomatic Strategy)

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afraid
that the opposition in Washington to Britain obtaining Polaris and to the
special nuclear relationship
with Britain would be strengthened by such a set-
back and force Kennedy to retreat from selling Polaris,
and from the nuclear
relationship in general; so he did not reveal the news in Nassau.

Nevertheless, against the background of the continuing post-war economic
problems, and the frosty
relationship between Britain and the U.S. after the Suez
Canal crisis, MacMillan managed to re-establish
the friendly relationship that had
existed between Churchill and Truman and bring about the ‘special
relationship’
that Churchill always wanted Britain to have with the United States.
Consequently,
MacMillan even managed to maintain an independent nuclear
deterrent for Britain, which thus remained a
member of the ‘nuclear club’. As has
been pointed out, MacMillan’s policy is still operating
today between the U.K.
and the U.S.. Thus MacMillan secured Britain’s defence and managed to
bring
the old Empire to a New Commonwealth, and prevented the ex-colonies from
falling into the
Communist sphere of influence. As I have said, MacMillan, like
Churchill and Eden, believed that Britain
was not exclusively European, and that
she should maintain her special link with the Commonwealth, the
sterling area
and the United States. Additionally, alliance with the United States was
fundamental
to Britain and her interests and security. However, the difference
between MacMillan, Churchill and Eden
was that MacMillan did not have
Churchillian nostalgia, nor Eden’s overestimation of Britain –
especially in the
face of her weakened economy and the U.S.S.R./U.S.A.’s superpower
status.
MacMillan was realistic and took the middle ground. Moreover, the Suez Crisis
was a lesson
that MacMillan took notice of; in other words the transatlantic
relationship must be based on
consultation and trust.

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